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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
SIGIFREDO EDUARDO SIERRA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
i Case No. 870350-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is 
established by 78-2a-3(2)(e), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, a 
Second Degree Felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the highway patrolman who stopped the Defendant's 
vehicle do so with reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant's 
vehicle and conduct an investigation or was the stop made as a 
pretext to conduct further investigation of this particular 
vehicle and Defendant? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE^ 
The Statutes believed to be determinative in this case 
are 41-6-53 and 77-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
1 
The statutes are set forth hereinafter as they now read. 
41-6-53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, was amended by 
House Bill 231 of the 1987 legislature and became effective on 
April 27, 1987. A copy of the Bill is attached in the addendum 
hereto, but the Appellant does not claim, that the alterations of 
the Statute are relevant to the issues on appeal. 
41-6-53. Duty to operate vehicle on right side 
of roadway - Exceptions. 
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, 
a vehicle shall be operated upon the right half 
of the roadway, except: 
(a) When overtaking and passing 
another vehicle proceeding in the same 
direction under the rules governing that 
movement; 
(b) When an obstruction requires 
operating the vehicle to the left of the center 
of the roadway, but the operator shall yield 
the right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in 
proper direction upon the unobstructed portions 
of the highway within a distance constituting 
an immediate hazard; 
(c) on a roadway divided into three 
marked lanes for traffic under the applicable 
rules; or 
(d) on a roadway designed and 
signposted for one-way traffic. 
(2) On all roadways a vehicle proceeding 
at less than the normal speed of traffic under 
the existing conditions shall be operated in 
the right-hand lane then available for traffic, 
or as close as practicable to the right-hand 
curb or edge of the roadway, except when 
overtaking and passing another vehicle 
preceeding in the same direction or when 
preparing for a left turn at an intersection or 
into a private road or driveway. 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop 
and question suspect - Grounds. 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act of 
2 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Possession of a 
Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, a 
Second Degree Felony. The decision in this case will turn on the 
determination of the reasonableness of a highway patrolman's 
investigatory stop of a vehicle on the interstate freeway south 
of Cedar City, Utah. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Defendant was arrested on March 6, 1987. A 
Preliminary Hearing was held on April 8, 1987, and the Defendant 
was bound over to the District Court for trial. The Defendant 
filed a Motion to Suppress the cocaine seized at the time of his 
arrest on the grounds that the stop made by the highway patrol 
trooper was pretextual in nature. The District Court based its 
decision upon the Preliminary Hearing for the reason that the 
Honorable J. Phillip Eves conducted the Preliminary Hearing as 
the Ninth Circuit Court Judge and then was appointed to the Fifth 
District Court bench and presided at the district court level as 
well. The Court denied the Motion to Suppress and thereafter the 
Defendant entered a plea of no contest. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
After entry of the plea of no contest, the Defendant 
requested immediate sentencing and the Court imposed a sentence 
of not less than one nor more that fifteen years at the Utah 
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State Prison. No fine was imposed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 6, 1987, at 2:57 p.m., Officer Kirk Smith of 
the Utah Highway Patrol was traveling on Interstate Fifteen 
northbound near milepost 20 which is in the vicinity of Leeds, 
Utah (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, 6) . At that time and 
place Trooper Smith saw a vehicle with New York license plates in 
front of him. Trooper Smith passed the vehicle on the left-hand 
side and noticed that the driver of the vehicle looked at the 
trooper and "then quickly looked back away from me and kinda 
bowed his head" (T. 7) . The Trooper then requested the Cedar 
City dispatcher of the Utah Highway Patrol to run a computer 
check of the vehicle to determine if it might be stolen. At 3:09 
p.m. the dispatcher replied to Trooper Smith that the vehicle was 
not stolen. However, Trooper Smith testified, "due to the 
suspicious nature and the way the subject had reacted when he 
seen (sic) me, I told Cedar that I was going to go after the 
vehicle, that I was going to check the vehicle more closely, and 
I asked if she had anybody in the area that she could send 
someone to assist me with this vehicle" (T. 7) (Transcript pages 
7 and 8 are included in the Addendum) . Trooper Smith then 
accelerated his vehicle in order to find the car with the 
New York license plate and traveled faster than the speed limit 
in order to locate the vehicle (T. 26) . Trooper Smith caught up 
with the vehicle at milepost 49 which is located in Iron County, 
and at the Preliminary Hearing he testified, "I decided I'd stop 
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this vehicle and explain to him our left-lane law" (T. 8) . 
Trooper Smith had followed the vehicle in the left-hand lane for 
forty to fifty seconds as the vehicle traveled fifty-six miles 
per hour and passed two other vehicles. Trooper Smith testified 
that the suspect car could have yielded on several occasions, but 
remained in the left-hand lane (T. 27) . Trooper Smith testified 
that the suspect vehicle was in the left-hand lane for 
approximately ten seconds after passing the second of the two 
cars before the Trooper turned on his red light and signaled the 
vehicle to pull over (T. 28). 
At the Motion to Suppress Hearing on May 19, 1987, the 
Defendant testified that when the Highway Patrolman saw him 
initially that he looked at the speedometer but did not attempt 
to hide his face from the Trooper (Motion to Suppress 
Transcript, 4). The Defendant also testified that he was 
traveling in the right-hand lane and was traveling at 55 miles to 
56 miles per hour ( Motion to Suppress Transcript, 5). 
Trooper Smith stopped the vehicle and asked Mr. Sierra 
for his drivers license and the registration of the vehicle. 
Mr. Sierra could not produce his drivers license but did present 
the registration card (T. 10). 
Trooper Smith thereafter went through a detailed series 
of investigative procedures which resulted in the arrest of the 
Defendant and the issuance of a search warrant. The vehicle was 
taken to Cedar City, Utah, and the gas tank removed from the 
vehicle. A secret compartment was disclosed and fifteen taped 
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packages were removed which were found to contain 31.3 pounds of 
cocaine that tested 96% pure (T. 29) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the Defendant-Appellant's contention that the 
highway patrol trooper had no reasonable suspicion to believe 
that the Defendant-Appellant had committed or was in the act of 
committing a public offense as set out in 77-7-15, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
The Defendant-Appellant also contends that the 
officer's intent to inform the Defendant-Appellant of the 
"left-lane law", 41-6-53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
was used as a pretext by the officer to conduct an investigation 
which otherwise could not be supported by reasonable suspicion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TROOPER SMITH HAD NO REASONABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE 
THAT THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS IN THE ACT OF 
COMMITTING A PUBLIC OFFENSE. 
The testimony at the Preliminary Hearing in this case 
indicates that Trooper Smith became curious about the 
Defendant-Appellant and at 2:57 p.m. requested a computer check 
on the vehicle to determine whether or not it was stolen. At 
3:09 p.m. the Trooper was informed that the vehicle was not 
stolen. However, the Trooper determined that the 
Defendant-Appellant had displayed a "suspicious nature" (T. 7) 
and at that point determined that he should follow the vehicle 
and thereafter traveled an additional 29 miles in order to "check 
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the vehicle more closely" (T. 7). 
The constitutional basis for statutes similar to 
77-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, is originally 
found in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1(1968). Terry established the 
proposition that an officer must have articulable facts upon 
which he could base a reasonable suspicion which then would 
support an investigatory stop of a suspect. The Utah Supreme 
Court has recently addressed the "reasonable suspicion" standard 
of 77-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, and found that 
"reasonable suspicion" was not present in two separate cases. In 
STATE V. CARPENA, 714 P. 2d 647 (1986) the Utah Supreme Court 
found that a car with an out-of-state license plate moving slowly 
through a neighborhood late at night was not sufficient evidence 
to support a reasonable suspicion allowing an investigatory 
stop. In STATE V. SWANIGAN, 699 P.2d 718 (1985), our Court found 
that an officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop a Defendant 
and his companion when an officer had been told by a fellow 
policeman that the Defendant and his companion had been walking 
along a street at a late hour where recent burglaries had been 
reported. 
In the instant case, the fact that the Defendant 
"quickly looked back away from me and kinda bowed his head" 
(T. 7) cannot be seen as an articulable fact which would support 
a reasonable suspicion that the Defendant was engaged in criminal 
conduct. 
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POINT II 
THE TROOPER fS STOP OF THE DEFENDANT TO INFORM HIM OF 
THE "LEFT-LANE LAW" WAS A PRETEXT TO CONDUCT AN 
INVESTIGATORY STOP WHICH WAS UNSUPPORTED BY REASONABLE 
SUSPICION. 
At the time that the Defendant-Appellant's vehicle was 
stopped, the Trooper making the stop had already been informed 
that the vehicle was not stolen. However, the Trooper had 
announced his intention to the dispatcher to "go after the 
vehicle" (T. 7) and had even requested that the dispatcher send 
someone for backup (T. 7). It would be unreasonable to presume 
that a Highway Patrol Trooper whose intention is to inform a 
driver of the "left-lane law" would need to have backup for such 
a stop. 
The trial court in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
specifically found that the Trooper had no pre-conceived idea 
that the Defendant-Appellant was a drug courier. Still, the 
Trooper's subsequent conduct in investigating the vehicle and its 
gas tank and gas gauge cannot support any other conclusion except 
that the traffic stop was made as a pretext to conduct a more 
detailed investigation for drugs. 
Careful reading of 41-7-53, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, in light of the facts of this case, makes it 
difficult to determine that the Trooper had any reason to suspect 
that the Defendant-Appellant was violating the "left-lane law". 
Under sub-paragraph (1)(d) of the Statute this was definitely a 
roadway designed for one-way traffic since it was the northbound 
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lane of the Interstate Freeway. As long as the 
Defendant-Appellant was traveling at the normal speed of traffic, 
he could lawfully operate his vehicle in the left-hand lane. 
Apparently he was doing so at 56 miles per hour and passing two 
other slower vehicles. 
Under all the factual circumstances of this case, it 
can only be concluded that the Trooper's decision to stop the 
Defendant-Appellant and discuss with him the "left-lane law" was 
a pretext for other investigatory purposes. Numerous cases have 
been decided where a stop has been determined to be pretextual in 
nature. The first "pretext" case was United States v. Lefkovitz, 
258 U.S. 452 (1932) wherein the United states Supreme Court 
announced that "an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search 
for evidence." In United States v. Keller, 499 F. Supp 415(1980) 
the Defendant was stopped because his vehicle had only one 
license plate. He was then arrested and taken into custody and 
searched and stolen credit cards were recovered. The Federal 
Court in that case determined that the Defendant's arrest 
was pretextual. In United States v. Millio, 588 F. Supp 45 
(1984) the prosecution and the defense stipulated that the 
surveillances of the Defendant were instigated to determine if 
the Defendant could objectively be stopped for a traffic 
violation. The Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and 
a firearm was recovered. In the circumstances of that case the 
stop was determined to be pretextual. The firearm was determined 
to have been illegally seized and the Defendant was discharged. 
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In United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986) the 
Officer questioned was looking for vehicles matching a drug 
courier profile. He observed the Defendant's car to weave six 
inches to the right of the right-hand lane line and then near but 
not over the painted center line of the highway. The stop of the 
Defendant's car was found to be pretextual and the conviction was 
reversed. In In United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 53 5 (5th 
Cir. 1978) the Court determined that a part-time Deputy Sheriff 
followed a vehicle for one mile and then stopped the vehicle 
to advise the driver that he had made an illegal U-turn and that 
such turns were dangerous. The Court found the stop to be a 
pretext to investigate for the presence of illegal aliens. The 
Defendant's were discharged and the conviction vacated. In 
Amador-Gonzales v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968), 
an Officer on a narcotics stakeout watched the Defendant circle a 
city block numerous times making sharp left turns which were 
executed illegally. Th€s narcotics officer called for other 
officers to stop the Defendant's vehicle. The other officers 
observed the Defendant driving 3 6 miles per hour in a 30 miles 
per hour zone prior to the stop. The Court in that case 
determined that the traffic stop was used as a pretext for a 
narcotics search and suppressed the evidence gained in the search 
and discharged the Defendant. In Taglavore v. United States, 291 
F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961) , the officers were given a Warrant of 
Arrest to arrest the Defendant for failing to signal and having 
faulty brake and signal lights. The Warrant was obtained by a 
10 
vice squad officer who had observed the violations the night 
before. The officers making the arrest were told that the 
Defendant was likely to have marijuana cigarettes in his 
possession. The Ninth Circuit Court in Taglavore pointed 
out that it was permissible to search incident to an arrest, but 
not vice versa. 
In all of the above cited cases, Courts have determined 
that traffic stops were pretextual and used merely as a screen 
for the investigatory procedures which were the objective of the 
arresting officers. The record in this case can only support the 
proposition that Trooper Smith was using the "left-lane law" as 
an excuse to stop the Defendant-Appelant's vehicle and conduct 
further investigations which would otherwise be unwarranted. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the officer had no reasonable suspicion to 
believe that the Defendant-Appellant had committed a public 
offense and because the "traffic stop" was merely a pretext to 
conduct an investigatory stop, the Defendant-Appellant's 
conviction should be reversed and his case should be remanded to 
the trial court where the evidence should be ordered suppressed. 
Respectfully submitted this -5O I day of October, 1987. 
J^ JflS^ 'L. SI 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
110 North Main Street 
P.O. Box 623 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-3772 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr, David 
L. Wilkinson, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 30 day of October, 1987, 
first class postage fully prepaid. 
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which is a part of a highway[t and if}. If it finds ; 
[that such] ,the structure [sennet] may not with ; 
safety, withstand vehicles traveling at the speed oth- i 
erwise permissible under this. chapter, the Depart-
ment of Transportation .shall determine [and j 
declare] the maximum speed of vehicles which [sueh] 
the structure can withstand, and shall cause or 
permit suitable signs stating [seeh] the maximum 
speed to be erected and maintained before each end 
of [sueh] the structure. 
(3) Upon the trial of [any] a person charged with 
a violation of this section, proof of [said] the dete-
rmination .of the maximum speed by the Department 
of Transportation and the existence of [said] the 
signs [shall] constitute conclusive evidence of the 
maximum speed which Jean] may be maintained 
with safety (to such] on the bridge or structure. 
Section 50. Section Amended. 
Section 41-6-51, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
amended to read* 
41-6-51. Speed contest or exhibition on highway 
- Barricade or obstruction. 
[(a) No] (1) A person [shall] may not engage in 
any motor
 v vehicle speed contest or exhibition of 
speedt on a highway [and no-person shall] or aid or 
abet in any [sueh] motor vehicle speed contest or 
exhibition on any highway. 
[(b) No] (2) A person [sh&U] may not, for the 
purpose of faahtating or aiding or as an incident to 
any motor vehicle speed contest upon a Jiighway, in 
any manner obstruct or place any barricade or 
obstruction or assist or participate in placing any 
[such] $>arricade or obstruction upon any highway. 
Section 51. Section Amended. 
Section 41-6-52, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
amended to read: 
41-6-52. Speed violation - Complaint - Civil 
negligence. 
[(a)] (\} In every charge of violation of any speed 
[regulation m this act] provision of this article, the 
compJaintJr-also] and the summons or notice to 
appesrfr] *hai! specify the speed at which, the defe-
ndant is alleged to have [dttven] operated a vehicle, 
also the prima facie speed applicable within the 
district or at the location. 
[(b)] (2} The provisions of this [aet] article decl-
aring , pnma facie speed limitations [shall not be 
construed to] do not relieve the plaintiff in any civil 
action from the butden of proving negligence on the 
part of the defendant as the proximate cause of an 
accident. 
Section 52. Section Amended. 
Section 41-6-53, Utah Code .Annotated 1953, 
as ilast amended by Chapter * 207, Laws of Utah 
1975, is amended to read. 
41-6-53. Duty to operate vehicle on right side of 
roadway - Exceptions. 
[(a) Upon] (1) On all loadways of sufficient 
width, a vehicle shall be (driven] operated upon the 
right half of the roadway, except [as-feHews]: 
'- [(*)] {§} when overtaking and passing another 
vehicle proceeding in the same direction
 4under the 
rules governing [s**eh] that movement; tlM, * v 
~- r£)l fb), when, an obstruction {tx*sts ^making it 
necessary to drive] requires operating the vehicle to 
the left of the center of the, roadwayfc-provided any 
person ,80 doing], but the operator shall yield the 
right-of-way to all vehicles traveling in the proper 
direction upon the unobstructed portions of the 
highway within [saeh} a distance^** *ftl ™™**fr"**i 
constituting an immediate hazard; 
[(3) Upon] (c) on a roadway divided! into three 
marked lanes for traffic under ,thc applicable rujes 
[applicable thereon]; or 
[(4) Upon] (d) on a roadway designed^and, signp-
osted for one-way traffic. 
[(b)~ypeft] (2) On all roadways [any] a vehicle 
proceeding atj less than the normal speed of, traffic 
[at-the-ttmc and plaee] under the existing conditions 
[then-existing] shall be [dftven] operated in the right-
hand lane then available for traffic, or as close as 
practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the 
roadway, except when overtaking and passing 
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction or 
when preparing for a left turn at an intersection or 
into a private road or driveway. • ' 
Section 53. Section Amended. ' 
Section 41-6-54, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
amended to read* 
41-6-54. Passing vehicles proceeding in opposite 
directions. 
[Drivers] Operators of vehiclest proceeding in 
opposite directions shall pass eaclx other £o .the right 
[an^-ttpoflj. „On roadways iavjng ,widtn' for riot 
more than one line of traffic in each direction^ each 
[dr-tver] operator shall give, to the other at least one-
half of the main traveled portion of the roadway as 
nearly as possible. 
Section 54. Section Amended. 
Section, 4i-$-55, Utah Code sAnnolated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter \j94,, Laws of,l/tah 
1985, is amended to read: 
41-6-55. Overtaking and passing vehicles 
proceeding In same direction!. 
The [following rules govern t W overtaking and 
passing of vehicles proceeding fa jhe same 4irectio 
[T] IS subject to the following provisions: 
(1) The [dove*] operator of a vehicle overtaking 
another vehicle proceeding in the same direction 
shall pass to the left at a safe distance and may not 
again drive to the right side p t t h e roadway until 
safely clear of the overtaken vehicle. „ 'fj «,
 f -
(2) The [dfiver;] operator of an overtaken vehicle 
shall give way to the right in favor of the overtaking 
vehicle and may not increase the^speed of his vehicle 
until completely passed by the ovextakingVehicle.
 T * 
(3) On a [read] highway having more than one 
lane in the same direction, the [drive*] operator of a 
vehicle traveling in a left lane shall, upon being 
overtaken by another Vehicle in the same lane,' yield 
to the over-taking vehicle by^mo'viflg safely to the 
right, and may not impede the movement or' free 
flow of traffic in a left lane except: *K T^H^ 
(a) when overtaking and passing'another .vehicle 
proceeding in the same direction [under • the rules 
governing this movement]; 
(b) when preparing to turn left; 
• (c) when ^reasonably necessary in Response r to 
emergency conditions; 
(d) to avoid actual or potential traffic moving 
onto the right lane from an /acceleration or merging 
lane; or 
(e) when necessary t*> follow
 r(the -highway] direc-
tion signs' that, direct use of mJane,other than the 
right lane. 
[(4) Violation of this flection is'Q closq B rmsde-
meanefr] 
370 
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Addendum page 1 of 3 
3 
8 
9 
10 
11 
IS 
16 
17 
18 
19 
2Q 
21 
22 
23 
e 
e 
1 A. At that time I noticed a vehicle in front of me 
2 that bore New York license plates. The number on the licens 
plate was KGY554, had one subject driving. I took note 
4
 of the license number and as I proceeded to pass the vehicl 
5
 I on the left side, the driver looked over at me and then 
6
 quickly looked back away from me and kinda bowed his head 
7
 This action made me rather suspicious so I called our Cedar 
dispatch to ask if she could check the NCIC, which is the 
National Computer, to see if there was a possibility this 
vehicle was stolen. 
MR. SHUMATE: Could we hold for a translation 
^
2
 on that, your Honor? 
13
 THE COURT: Certainly 
14
 J MR. SHUMATE: Thank you 
THE COURT: All right. 
Q. (By Mr. Oehler) What happened then? 
A. The time on that was about 2:57. At 3:09 p.m. 
Cedar dispatch informed me that the vehicle was not listed 
as stolen, but due to the suspicious nature and the way 
the subject had reacted when he seen me, I told Cedar that 
I was going to go after the vehicle, that I was going to 
check the vehicle more closely, and I asked if she had anybody 
in the area that she could send someone to assist me with 
I this vehicle 
2 5 1
 MR. SHUMATE: Your Honor, could we hold again for 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . JR. 
Ccf t r i r ico S H O R T H A N D ft<j»c>ftTKJt 
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Addendum page 2 of 3 
3 
4 | 
5 | 
6 
7 
B 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
IB 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
1
 j a translation? 
2
 I THE COURT: Certainly. 
0 {By Mr. Oehler) Tell us what took place then. 
A At that time I left the Leeds area and started north 
on 1-15. At approximately Milepost 49, 1 again encountered 
the subject vehicle. This time the vehicle was travelinq 
at 56 miles per hour and it was in the left lane. 
Q. Is Milepost 46 m Cedar? 
A. Forty-nine. 
Q. Forty-nine. Is that in Iron County? 
A. Yes, it is in Iron County. 
Q. Okay. What did you see next? 
A. Well, I followed the vehicle about 40 seconds --
40 to 50 seconds, somewhere like that, but, not a real 
long time, in the left lane. And as we passed two vehicles, 
I decided I'd stop this vehicle and explain to him our 
left-lane law, give him a warning for traveling in the left 
lane and not yielding immediately. He had a couple opportunities 
to get into the right lane even though he had passed a couple 
of vehicles. I decided that I would pull fyim over at that 
point and inform him of our left-lane law. 
We were in the left when I activated my red spotlight. 
The subject yielded immediately, pulled hi^ vehicle to the 
right and stopped in the emergency lane. 
MR. SHUMATE: Could we hold again for translation, 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . JR.
 Q 
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